Eliciting environmental preferences of Ghanaians in the laboratory: An incentive-compatible experiment by Meroz, Yael et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Eliciting environmental preferences of
Ghanaians in the laboratory: An
incentive-compatible experiment
Yael Meroz and Andrea Morone and Piergiuseppe Morone
4. September 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17107/
MPRA Paper No. 17107, posted 5. September 2009 07:33 UTC
 1 
Eliciting environmental preferences of Ghanaians in 
the laboratory:  
An incentive-compatible experiment♦ 
 
Yael Meroz 
 
Andrea Morone 
 
Piergiuseppe Morone 
University of Foggia 
y_meroz@yahoo.it 
 
University of Bari 
a.morone@gmail.com 
University of Foggia 
p.morone@gmail.com 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper we aim to look into the attributes of Ghanaians’ willingness-to-pay for green 
products. This would help us to assess whether Ghanaians show a preference towards environmental 
goods. The methodology employed to address these issues is an ‘experimentally-adapted’ CV survey 
which involves laboratory experiment conducted among Ghanaian University students. Notwithstanding 
the limitations arising from the sample used in our experiment (most notably University students do not 
represent, economically wise, the entire Ghanaian population), we believe that our investigation provides 
a first answer to such question as Ghanaians consistently show that they are willing to pay an extra 
premium for green products. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that consumers are among the strongest actors in market economy is as old as the study 
of Economics.1 The idea, however, that consumers also hold power to influence production 
patterns and direct them into being more environmentally-friendly, expressing, on the market, 
their willingness to pay a higher premium for products which generate smaller environmental 
damage has emerged with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1970s, gaining 
momentum only in the last two decades or so.2  
In order to assess the extra premium that consumers are willing to pay for green products or 
services, which typically have no real markets, environmental economics has developed several 
methods. Among such techniques we can list the hedonic prices method, the travel cost method, 
the contingent valuation (CV) method and the elicitation of the willingness to pay (WTP) for an 
environmental good or service or, alternatively, willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for 
environmental damage or for the loss of an environmental good or service.3  
In this paper we will tackle this very issue concentrating our attention on less developed countries 
(LDCs). Specifically, we shall consider the Ghanaian case study, trying - through a laboratory 
experiment - to look into the attributes of a group of Ghanaian students’ willingness to pay for 
green products (an organic banana in our case). Using the Experimental Economics technique, 
this study will try to answer the question whether in our experimental sample there is a tendency 
to attach a value to environmental goods or not. 
                                                 
1 Hirschman (1970), for example, has divided consumer sanction power over corporate behaviour into three types: a 
positive sanction “loyalty”, a negative sanction “exit” (terminating a business relationship) and “voice” (complaining 
or negative word-of-mouth).  
2
 See, for instance, Kinnear and Taylor (1973); Martin and Simintiras (1995); and Prothero and McDonagh (1993). 
For example, it has been shown that US consumers may be willing to pay as high as 12 percent more for certified 
wood products, knowing that their purchase will contribute to the conservation or protection of forests (Ozanne and 
Vloskey, 2003). 
3
 For a more thorough analysis of these methods, see Pearce and Turner (1990). It is worth-noting, though, that these 
techniques are used not only to estimate the value of “greener” market products, but also (and mainly) to elicit the 
value of non-market goods such as a beautiful landscape, clear air or an endangered species.   
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In order to do so we will first briefly review the debate on environmental issues and less 
developed countries (section 2). After providing a brief review of the core theoretical issues 
(section 3), we will present a description of the experiment conducted at the University of Ghana 
at Legon (section 4) to be followed by the presentation and the interpretation of the obtained 
results (section 5). Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and suggestions for possible 
extensions of this work. 
 
2. Environment, contingent valuation and Developing Countries  
An inquiry into the demand for green products (or, more generally, into the issue of 
environmental concern) is quite common in the case of developed countries, where the 
willingness to pay for organic products was often investigated.4 However, in the case of LDCs, 
this field of study does not represent a very attractive research objective. In fact, many studies 
argue that this pattern of demand is very much correlated with the level of socioeconomic 
development (understood in terms of the level of GDP per capita). In other words, the assumption 
is that the demand (and with it, the willingness to pay) for products that are associated with more 
sustainable practices grows hand in hand with income.5  
However, in the last 15 years or so CV has become a common method for the appraisal of WTA 
and WTP of the population in LDCs for improvement/worsening of environmental conditions 
(Carson et al., 1995). Indeed, there are obvious difficulties which the application of stated-
preference techniques in LDCs presents, and in practical terms gathering correct and valuable 
                                                 
4
 See, for instance, Gil et al. (2000) for Spain; Boccaletti and Nardella (2000) for Italy, and Cranfield and 
Magnusson (2003) for Canada.  
5
 The Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis, which suggests that environmental damage first rises with economic 
growth and then declines, is at the heart of this assumption. According to this hypothesis, environmental damage is 
bound to decline since the increase in economic indicators represents structural changes that lead the economy 
towards more information-intensive practices. This change is coupled with growing environmental awareness - 
associated with post-modern societies - which gives rise to green consumerism. See Panayotou (1993), and Dasgupta 
et al. (2002).  
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information (through polls, surveys, questionnaires or experiments) could be an extremely 
difficult and problematic task to accomplish in such a context.6  
A prominent aim of this work is hence to test what we shall call the ‘too poor to be green’ 
hypothesis7 by means of an experimental analysis. Having in mind the nature of experiments 
(which are typically conducted among small groups of students), we are very much aware of the 
fact that our findings could hardly be generalised to the whole developing world or even to the 
single case of Ghana. 8 Other possible shortcomings of the experimental approach relate to the 
considerations raised by Levitt and List (2007). More specifically, the authors pointed out that 
subjects in an experiment are usually not driven by solely monetary calculations, but also by at 
least five other factors, which should be taken into account in the analysis of the experiment’s 
results: (1) the presence of moral and ethical considerations; (2) the nature and extent of scrutiny 
of one’s actions by others; (3) the context in which the decision is embedded; (4) self-selection of 
the individuals making the decisions; (5) the stakes of the game. 
Bearing in mind such possible biases, experiments can be designed to minimise them. Further, if 
the sign and plausible magnitude of the biases induced by the lab are known, one can extract 
useful information from a study, even if the results cannot be seamlessly extrapolated outside the 
lab. In this sense, even in cases where lab results are believed to have little ‘generalizability’, 
some number from a laboratory estimate is better than no number, provided that a theoretical 
model is used to make an appropriate inference. We now try to tackle this very problem, showing 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion on the technical difficulties and problems associated with the conduction of CV in developing 
countries, see Whittington (2002). 
7
 Under the logic of ‘too poor to be green’ (as poignantly put by Martinez-Alier, 1995), some economists maintain 
that due to their low income level, developing countries’ citizens do not have a preference for environmental goods 
(see, for instance, Wolf, 2004 or Thurow, 1980). 
8
 Note that the issue of generalising experimental results is a mach debated one. See, for instance Smith (1976), 
Samuelson, (2005). 
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that our experimental design overcomes many of the concerns pointed out by Levitt and List 
(2007).  
When looking into point (1) we can argue that the growing debate on ethical values attached to 
organic production observable in most developed countries is fare from being an issue in a 
country like Ghana, where there is no real market for organic products; hence, the ethical aspects 
of organic production should not be a concern for our subject pool. 
Concerning point (2), the experiment consisted in an individual decision making process and 
subjects’ behaviour was able to influence their own pay-off only and never other subjects’ 
decisions. 
The third issue raised by Levitt and List could be a problem in an experiment addressing 
environmental issues. However, in the context of our experiment it should be stressed again that 
Ghanaians cannot have been biased in favour of organic bananas a-priori since there is no real 
market for organic products in the country. 
As far as point (4) is concerned, it must be said that our experiment suffered from this problem 
less than experiments run in the US or in Europe as some of the people that participate in such 
experiments are ‘experts’, in the sense that they often take part in many other experiments – and 
this was not the case in our experiment.  
Concerning point (5), we would like to underline that in our experiment we had a ‘big stake’, 
with subjects in a position to earn, in about an hour, goods (bananas) or moneys equivalent to as 
high as 5$ which is roughly a daily salary in Ghana.  
As already mentioned, information on the willingness to pay of consumers in developing 
countries for goods with more sustainable attributes is quite scarce. As also observed by Ara in a 
study about consumer WTP for organic rice in the Philippines, “a large number of consumer 
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surveys on organic agricultural produce as well as food safety have been conducted in developed 
countries, yet the number of studies in developing countries is very limited” (Ara, 2003: 2). This 
observation is true also in the case of Ghana, where there are hardly any studies on this question.9 
Indeed, organic food production in Ghana is quite limited. However, it has been steadily growing 
in the last years and various products (amongst them bananas, pineapples, tomatoes, coconuts, 
etc.), some for local consumption while others for export, have followed the organic production 
protocol to various extents (Scialabba, 2000; Willer and Yussefi, 2004). The organic product 
referred to in this study (bananas) is a case in point: VREL (Volta River Estates Limited), the 
organic bananas producer in Ghana, although relatively small, is currently one of the leading 
agricultural companies in the country and the only exporter of organic bananas.10 
 
3. Aim and Methodological Background of the Experiment 
As explained above, we address the issue of the poor and the environment by means of a 
laboratory incentive-compatible experiment which was conducted at the University of Ghana at 
Legon (Accra). Specifically, we attempt to test whether Ghanaians display a preference for green 
products (organic bananas) when compared to non-green products.  
If proved to be true, this would allow us to infer that Ghanaians do have a preference for the 
environment and that they are willing to pay an extra premium in order to preserve it, hence 
countering the ‘too poor to be green’ argument. However, we should bear in mind that our 
                                                 
9
 Two exceptions are worth noting in the literature vacuum context: the first is of a study which examined 
consumers’ WTP for tomatoes produced without chemicals. According to the study, which consisted in a household 
survey in various cities throughout Ghana, about 50 percent of urban households were willing to pay, on average, 80 
percent more for organic food, 10 percent were indifferent and 40 percent believed that a price lower by 50 percent 
would be appropriate9 (IWMI, International Water Management Institute, cited in Danso et al., 2002). Other results 
were obtained by another study on consumer WTP for pesticide-free and germ-free fresh vegetables. In this case, on 
average, the sampled consumers in the capital Accra were willing to pay 20 percent more for a germ-free cabbage 
and almost 30 percent more for a pesticide-free one (Al-Hassan and Jatoe, 2005).  
10
 See Siaw (2003). Here, it is worth mentioning that 15 percent of the produce is sold in big cities’ markets in Ghana 
(with no particular tag or label) (see VREL’s website).  
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experiment is conducted among a small group of students which probably do not represent the 
average Ghanaian due to the high level of income inequality present in the country, hence we 
shall be very cautious in inferring any generalisation from our empirical findings.  
We will attempt to estimate subjects’ preferences using two alternative elicitation mechanisms. 
Specifically, we shall confront subject preferences elicited in a choice context and subject 
preferences elicited in a price context.  
In the former case, the subject faces a choice between two different quantities of two goods 
(organic versus non-organic bananas, in our case); after having expressed his/her preference, the 
subject receives the good opted for.11  
In the latter case subjects are asked to indicate their reservation price to buy a certainty amount of 
organic (non-organic) bananas. Note that the price context requires the implementation of the so-
called BDM mechanism12 (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1964). This specific incentive 
scheme was originally developed to construct a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function by 
determining a series of certainty equivalent of binary lotteries. Here subjects are asked to state an 
amount of money such that they do not care whether they will receive this amount or the good. 
Then, a number z is randomly drawn between 1 and y, where y is higher than the value of the 
good in question. If z is greater or equal to the amount stated by the subject, he/she receives y, 
otherwise he/she receives y - z and the good itself. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This should serve as a guarantee that subjects express their true preference. 
12
 There are two orders of reasons which support our decision to use BDM: first and foremost, Hey, Morone and 
Schmidt (2007) showed in a recent paper how (under the assumption that subjects have Expected Utility functions) 
“BDM performs better then ASK [WTA], which, in turn, performs better than BID [WTP]” (2007: 13); secondly, 
given the fact that at the University of Ghana there was no computer laboratory available to conduct the experiments, 
BDM turned to be more suitable for paper and pencil experiments. 
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4. The Experiment 
The paper-and-pencil experiment was conducted at the University of Ghana at Legon (Accra) in 
October 2005. The experiment’s administration was facilitated through the use of a booklet13 
handed out to each subject. The booklet contained the actual experimental design, which 
consisted of two treatments, one where subjects were asked to state their preference through the 
indication of a price, (henceforth Treatment 1) and one where they were asked to do so by 
choosing between two alternatives (henceforth Treatment 2). The whole procedure was carefully 
explained to all participants before starting the experiments.  
38 subjects, each handed out with the above-mentioned booklet, participated in the experiment.14 
Subjects were admitted to only one treatment to avoid anchor effects. More precisely, in both 
treatments 19 undergraduate and postgraduate students participated. Two additional treatments 
were run in October 2006 where we interviewed 20 students following a standard CV approach. 
Each treatment lasted for about an hour. 
The issues of subject pool and sample size deserve some further attention. As aforementioned, we 
do not believe that these students are wholly representative of the Ghanaian society; we are very 
much aware of the fact that higher education in Ghana is costly and that students are thus 
generally from families which are, at least to a limited extent, better-off. Even so, we believe that 
university students are most likely to produce, in the future, the new leadership class of the 
country; a leadership able to influence the ideas and patterns of behaviours of local communities, 
either through a direct participation in policymaking processes - for instance, as politicians - or 
through a grassroot type of activism - for instance, as tribal chiefs or as NGO activists. Having 
this in mind, we shall maintain that the Ghanaian students, who participated in the experiments, 
                                                 
13
 The booklet is available from the authors upon request. 
14
 Note that we originally recruited 20 students for each treatment; however, in each treatment one student did not 
show up. 
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while not representative of the entire population, are most likely to turn into important agents of 
change in their society. As such, their valuation of the environment appears to be particularly 
interesting and pertinent to the question of policymaking. Moreover, the size of the sample is a 
relevant matter. We wish to underline that although 38 students (19 in each treatment) might 
appear a rather small sample, it is strictly comparable with most experimental papers (see, for 
instance, Hey and Orme, Econometrica, 1994; Hey and Morone, Economica, 2004; Turocy, 
Watson and Battalio, Experimental Economics, 2007; Bullock Rutström, Experimental 
Economics, 2007).15  
We shall now describe the way the experiment was conducted: under Treatment 1 subjects were 
asked to state the price they were willing to pay to buy q organic bananas, where q ∈ [1, 20] ⊂ N. 
They were requested to state their WTP by filling in a table of the type reported in Box 1. 
  
Please insert in each raw how much you want to pay to buy the indicated amount of Organic and 
Non Organic Bananas: 
  
 Organic Bananas Cedi  Non Organic Bananas Cedi  
1 1 banana  1 banana  
2 2 bananas  2 bananas  
3 3 bananas  3 bananas  
4 4 bananas  4 bananas  
5 5 bananas  5 bananas  
6 6 bananas  6 bananas  
7 7 bananas  7 bananas  
8 8 bananas  8 bananas  
9 9 bananas  9 bananas  
10 10 bananas  10 bananas  
11 11 bananas  11 bananas  
12 12 bananas  12 bananas  
13 13 bananas  13 bananas  
14 14 bananas  14 bananas  
15 15 bananas  15 bananas  
16 16 bananas  16 bananas  
17 17 bananas  17 bananas  
                                                 
15
 As already mentioned, our experiment is an individual decision making experiment, i.e. there is no interaction 
among subjects. Hence, each subject represents an independent observation. 
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18 18 bananas  18 bananas  
19 19 bananas  19 bananas  
20 20 bananas  20 bananas  
A 
Box 1: Price-organic, table filled-in by subjects  
 
Under Treatment 2, on the other hand, subjects were asked to choose between q organic bananas and 
(q + i) non-organic bananas, where q ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N, and i ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N. Subjects were requested to 
state their choices by filling in a table of the type reported in Box 2.16 
 
 
N Organic Banana   Non-organic banana  
1 1 banana  6 bananas  
2 2 bananas  7 bananas  
3 3 bananas  8 bananas  
4 4 bananas  9 bananas  
5 5 bananas  10 bananas  
6 6 bananas  11 bananas  
7 7 bananas  12 bananas  
8 8 bananas  13 bananas  
9 9 bananas  14 bananas  
10 10 bananas  15 bananas  
A 
Box 2: Choice-organic (i = 5), table filled-in by subjects 
 
 
In both treatments we used incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms. Subject reservation 
price was elicited with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, where each subject had to 
state his/her real WTP for the organic good. More concretely, once subjects have handed in their 
booklets, the experimenter randomly selected a subject who got the right to play the game: in 
Treatment 1 the subjects randomly picked up had to buy the banana/s at his/her stated price; in 
Treatment 2 the subjects randomly picked up was paid according to the choice made in the 
experiment (i.e. received the banana/s chosen). All other subjects received approximately $ 3.3 
                                                 
16
 We are aware that this is not the conventional dichotomous choice used in contingent valuation experimental 
design, but since the two goods in question differ only in one attribute (their being organic or not), we shall maintain 
that our design is better suited to elicit subjects’ preferences towards organic goods. 
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(30,000 cedi) as participation fee. As noted earlier, the whole procedure was carefully explained to 
all participants before starting the experiments.  
 
5. Results 
We will now report the main results obtained in the experiment. As mentioned earlier we 
attempted to elicit the real extra premium that subjects, as consumers, are willing to pay for green 
products (organic bananas) in Ghana. In figures 1 and 2 we report subjects’ willingness to pay for 
a growing number of respectively organic and non-organic bananas. Consequently the slopes of 
these curves (λ) represent the reservation prices attributed by players to both organic and non-
organic bananas. As we can see, the slope of these curves is almost constant as the curves tend to 
be linear in fashion. This suggests that under the assumption of linearity, marginal price (i.e. the 
reservation price for each additional unit of the good considered) and average price coincide. 
Moreover, this implies that the marginal price expressed by subjects is independent from the 
quantity acquired, suggesting that players do not show the occurrence of income or substitution 
effects. Note that this finding should not come as a surprise given the relatively small number of 
bananas offered in our experiment. 
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Figure 1: Subjects’ willingness to pay for organic      
products (price-organic) 
Figure 2: Subjects’ willingness to pay for non-organic 
products (price-organic) 
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Further to this, it is relevant to show how our result counters the Diamond et al. (1993, 1994) 
critique according to which WTP analysis does not pass the adding-up test due to the embedding 
effect - i.e. that willingness-to-pay is the same whether one or several items are valued. We are 
not, by any means, maintaining that our result contradicts the overall significance of Diamond et 
al.’s argument; however, we hold that it does not apply to the specific environmental good 
considered in this experiment. 
We shall now estimate the slope of each curve, under the assumption of linearity, and compare 
them across subjects.17 Note that the price ratio 








−organicnon
organic
λ
λ
 calculated subject by subject 
represents the substitution rate of the two goods.  Therefore, this rate can give us a measure of the 
‘organic premium’ i.e. the appreciation of the environment as it is expressed directly by the 
Ghanaians who participated to the experiment. In other words, looking at these ratios will allow 
us to verify whether Ghanaians display a preference for green products when compared to non-
organic ones. Note that a substitution rate higher than 1 implies a preference for green products 
(and, consequently, a higher willingness to pay), whereas a value smaller than 1 implies a 
preference for non-organic goods. Of course, if the ratio is equal to unity it implies that the two 
goods are perceived as perfect substitutes in a ratio of 1 to 1.  
The data displayed in table 1 shows that in 13 out of 19 cases subjects exhibit a preference for 
organic goods. This finding suggests that almost 68.5 percent of the players that took part at the 
experiment expressed a preference for environmentally-friendly goods (i.e. organic bananas). 
This awareness to environmental issues results in the willingness to pay, on average, 20 percent 
                                                 
17
 We do this by means of OLS estimates. 
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more for green products. If we consider the premium only for those subjects who have stated a 
preference for green products, than the figure goes up to around 35 percent.18  
 
Subjects λorganic λnon-organic substitution rate
1 700.800 499.930 1.402
2 532.400 500.000 1.065
3 467.420 367.420 1.272
4 433.830 500.000 0.868
5 411.500 593.620 0.693
6 349.790 500.000 0.700
7 697.040 400.000 1.743
8 806.450 485.440 1.661
9 463.420 200.000 2.317
10 465.160 511.150 0.910
11 482.970 460.310 1.049
12 647.080 400.000 1.618
13 726.100 612.400 1.186
14 440.980 363.900 1.212
15 839.870 678.710 1.237
16 793.210 477.530 1.661
17 465.160 500.000 0.930
18 332.340 429.090 0.775
19 928.230 643.620 1.442
 
Table 1: Organic-non organic substitution rate (choice-organic) 
 
 
We shall now compare these findings with those obtained in Treatment 2. Looking at figure 3, we 
have a very clear picture: 36.84 percent of the subjects always chose the organic product, while 
26.32 percent always preferred the non-organic product. Slightly more than one fifth of all 
subjects (21.05 percent) first expressed their preference for the organic product and subsequently, 
once the number of non-organic bananas was sufficiently high (i.e. when the i value was 
sufficiently high), switched to the non-organic product. Three subjects seem to be inconsistent 
                                                 
18
 We note that this finding, obtained through an incentive-compatible experiment in a laboratory environment, 
confirms previous results obtained using a WTP survey approach. The already cited study of Al-Hassan and Jatoe 
(2005) found that consumers interviewed in the capital Accra were willing to pay 20 percent more for a germ-free 
cabbage and almost 30 percent more for a pesticide-free one. It should be stressed, however, that while the 
aforementioned study was focused on the health implications of pesticide use, our study investigated attitudes 
towards environmentally-sound practices, where human health implications are only but one element. 
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since they do not respect transitivity (e.g. after having first stated their preference for 2 non-
organic bananas over 1 organic banana, they switched their preferences to 1 organic banana over 
3 non-organic bananas). 
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        Figure 3: Subjects’ categorisation in the choice data experiment (choice-organic) 
 
 
Overall, these results confirm our earlier findings (i.e. Treatment 1): almost 58 percent of the 
experimental subjects19 displayed a preference for organic products, out of which 36.84 percent 
showed a persistent preference for organic products (i.e. regardless of the number of extra non-
organic bananas offered during the experiment).20  
All in all, we can conclude that also by looking at choice data we get a confirmation to our 
hypothesis. Moreover, as noted earlier, only few subjects provided inconsistent answers (3 out of 
                                                 
19
 This percentage goes up to 68.74 if we exclude those three agents who showed an inconsistent behaviour. 
Interestingly enough, this percentage is exactly the same as the one obtained with price data. 
20
 Note that typically, Ghanaians prefer the small non-organic bananas that, they claim, are sweeter. This preference 
is also explainable by the fact that the bigger, organic bananas are normally exported, so as to satisfy preferences of 
developed countries consumers and not local. Assuming that also the participants in the experiment tend to prefer the 
non-organic bananas for their sweetness, we can conclude that our results - where a clear preference towards organic 
bananas has been observed - are even more significant. 
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38 if we consider both experimental sessions). This suggests that students involved in the 
experiment have clearly understood the type of experiment they took part in and that the 
incentive scheme was appropriate (hence, the standard preferences elicitation techniques in an 
incentive-compatible experiment turned out to be an adequate tool to elicit Ghanaians preferences 
towards the environment).  
In general, choice experiments, though simpler to understand, provide less information if 
compared to price experiments. In fact, with choice data we cannot calculate the exact 
substitution rate of the two goods. We can, however, calculate the threshold value above which 
agents are willing to opt for one good or the other. In table 2 we report these threshold values 
calculated for each subject.21 First, we observe that such threshold is not calculable for those 
players who were earlier classified as inconsistent as they move back and forth from such 
threshold. Second, we can see that for seven subjects all we can say is that the substitution 
threshold lies somewhere above the ratio one to 11; in fact, we are unable to identify this 
threshold in our experiment (if existing at all), where the highest substitution rate proposed to 
players was as high as one to 11. Third, four players are either indifferent (with a ratio of one) 
between the two goods or prefer non-organic bananas. Forth, for three agents we can define an 
interval of substitution included among two adjacent integers. Finally, for one player we can 
pinpoint the exact substitution rate, under the assumption that random answers within the same i-
group of questions imply indifference.22 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Note that comparing the substitution rate reported in table 6 and the substitution thresholds reported in table 7, we 
can observe significant differences. These are, of course, due to the different elicitation methods used in the two 
sessions. 
22
 Recall that in treatment 2 subjects were asked to choose between q organic bananas and (q + i) non-organic bananas, 
where q ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N , and  i ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N . 
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Subjects Threshold of 
substitution 
1 confused
2 a>11
3 3<a<4
4 a>11
5 a>11
6 a=2
7 confused
8 a>11
9 4<a<5
10 a<2
11 a<2
12 a<2
13 a<2
14 a>11
15 a>11
16 6<a<7
17 confused
18 a<2
19 a>11
 
Table 2: Organic-non organic substitution thresholds (choice-organic) 
 
As already discussed, in this experiment we used an incentive-based mechanism in order to elicit 
the real willingness to pay for organic bananas which and, we shall maintain, this mechanism 
turned out to be an adequate tool to elicit Ghanaians preferences towards the environment. For 
the sake of clarity, we shall now compare these findings with those obtained through standard CV 
interviews (i.e. where subjects were not faced with a real payment scenario). In table 3 we 
compare the hypothetical questions results with the incentive-based results. Note that the average 
price obtained in the incentive compatible experiment is higher than the CV average price in both 
treatments. Comparison of simple averages yields calibration factors of 0.674 and 0.668 for 
organic and non-organic treatments, respectively. Note, moreover, that S.D. is always higher in 
the CV surveys. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the price elicited through the incentive 
compatible experiment is closer to the market price. More precisely, the experimental price is 
higher than the market price for organic bananas (hence displaying the willingness to pay an 
 17 
environmental premium) and lower for non-organic bananas. In the CV surveys the average price 
is always lower than market price.  
All in all these two additional treatments show that the CV study without incentive provided 
results which are less comparable to the market price and with higher standard deviation. 
 
CV 415.39 230.78 316.83 131.48
Experiment 613.85 205.31 475.29 122.02
Calibration facor 0.6767 0.6666
Market Price* ~ 600 ~ 600
S.D.
* Market price is not precise as it depends on the size of the banana as well as on the 
quantity of the bananas bought
Average price
Organic Bananas Non Organic Bananas
Average price S.D.
 
Table 3: hypothetical questions vs. incentive-based experiment 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to investigate Ghanaians preferences towards the environment; we did 
so by means of a laboratory experiment conducted at the University of Legon in Accra. 
Specifically, we set the objective of addressing the hypothesis that Ghanaians display a 
preference for green products (organic bananas) when compared to non-green products. 
Our results suggest that such hypothesis holds in the case of Ghana. In fact, bearing in mind that 
our experiment has been conducted among University students, whose economic conditions are 
likely to be above the average Ghanaian, we can affirm that subjects are willing to pay an extra 
premium for an environmentally-friendly good. This finding counters what Brechin and Kempton 
have dubbed ‘the conventional wisdom’, according to which “citizens of developing countries do 
not or cannot care about the environment” (1994: 247).  
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We believe these results are a first step towards a much needed direct elicitation of local 
preferences towards the environment when formulating policies in LDCs. In terms of 
implications of our study, we feel that our results should stimulate further research aiming, 
eventually, at suggesting an environmental policy based on the direct involvement of local 
stakeholders in the definition of local policies.  
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